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Abstract
We examine the effect of reference health on the demand for medical care. We
propose and empirically implement a dynamic model of demand for medical care that
includes reference health, an average of previous health states. We find that gain or
loss from reference health significantly affects the demand for medical care. The effect
is stronger for losses than gains. The effect is strongest in the upper tail of medical care
consumers. We compare the predictions of our dynamic model with one that omits
reference health. Including reference health improves our ability to match individuals
in the top 5 percent by 65 percent.
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I Introduction
This paper incorporates elements from prospect theory in a dynamic model of de-
mand for medical care, allowing utility from health to be reference-dependent with
respect to health in previous periods (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2009; Baucells et al., 2011). The incor-
poration of reference health in the utility function enables us to better explain why
some relatively healthy individuals consume high levels of medical care, and why some
individuals in poor health do not. Existing economic models of health capital and
medical care demand specify utility only as a function of contemporaneous health and
consumption and have difficulty explaining the observed distribution of medical care
spending (Grossman, 1972; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Galama, 2011).
In the United States, medical care expenditures account for 17.7 percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and nearly nine percent of GDP (half of all expenditures)
is spent by the top five percent of medical care consumers (World Bank, 2014; Claxton
et al., 2014). Thus, understanding the demand for medical care at the top end of
the spending distribution is more important than explaining the behavior of the mean
or median consumer, whether predicting changes in expenditures, managing financial
risk, informing physician or facility capacity decisions. However, not all high medical
care spenders are in poor health. In fact, fewer than 20 percent of the top 5 percent
of spenders report poor health, while 7.5 percent report excellent health (Schoenman,
2012). Similarly, not everyone in poor health is a high consumer of medical care.
Nearly 40 percent of medical care spending by individuals in poor health is incurred
by the top 5 percent of that group (Claxton et al., 2014).
First, we present a simple two-period model to illustrate why individuals experienc-
ing a decline from reference health will demand more medical care, independent of their
current state of health.1 By comparing and contrasting our equilibrium conditions with
1Our model is a simplification of the continuous time optimal control model presented in Kohn and
Patrick (2012).
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existing models that do not include reference health, we show why including reference
health can better explain the top tail of the medical care spending distribution.
Next, we empirically evaluate our model by nesting a joint semi-parametric con-
ditional density estimation of the demand for medical care, consumption, and the
evolution of health in a finite mixture framework. Using the RAND Health and Re-
tirement Survey Data (HRS), we find that an individual’s reference health significantly
affects her demand for medical care. While reference health affects the demand for
medical care at all levels of spending, the effect is strongest at the top of the distribu-
tion of medical spending. An individual whose contemporaneous health is 10 percent
lower than her reference health is 22 percent more likely to be in the top 5 percent of
medical care consumers (consuming over $10,000 per year) than an individual with the
same contemporaneous health who did not experience a decline from reference health.
We also compare the predictions of our dynamic model with one more consistent with
the extant literature (omitting reference health). Including reference health improves
our ability to match individuals in the top 5 percent by 65 percent. Thus, while poor
health matters, we show that modeling the path to poor health better enables us to
predict which individuals end up in that top 5 percent. This is policy relevant as these
individuals account for 50 percent of all medical care expenditures.
Principally, this paper is the first to our knowledge to intersect the prospect the-
ory and reference-dependence literature with the human capital and health demand
literature(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Koszegi and
Rabin, 2006, 2009; Grossman, 1972; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Galama, 2011). By
incorporating reference dependence in the utility function, we extend the literature
that models the effects of reference dependent preferences on health, including rational
addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988). As our reference point is formed using adap-
tive expectations, we extend the literature on adaptation to changes in health states
(Groot, 2000; Contoyannis et al., 2004) and wealth states (Constantinides, 1990).
We also contribute to other recent theoretical and empirical work in dynamic models
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of heath and wealth over the lifecycle by focusing on explaining high medical care
spending. This other work (Hall and Jones, 2007; Edwards, 2008; Yang et al., 2009;
Yogo, 2009; Khwaja, 2010; Hugonnier et al., 2013; Monahan, 2013) has focused on
explaining consumption and investment decisions modeling health care expenses as
only one input to those decisions. Whereas prior work has focused on the conditional
mean, we focus on explaining the upper tail of medical care consumers.
Additionally, we offer empirical evidence on the relationship between health and
utility from consumption that can help reconcile conflicting findings in the literature
(Edwards, 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Finally, we contribute to the literature on
empirically modeling skewed distributions of medical care by nesting a semi-parametric
joint estimation of conditional densities within a finite mixture framework (Cameron
and Trivedi, 1986; Pohlmeier and Uhlrich, 1995; Cameron and Johansson, 1997; Deb
and Trivedi, 1997; Gurmu, 1997; Shen, 2013).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents a simple two-period
economic model that highlights the role of reference dependent utility from health in
explaining high medical care demand. Section III details our estimation strategy and
identification. Section IV describes the data used in estimation. Section V contains the
results of our model, including parameter estimates, simulated marginal effects, and
evidence on fitting the distributions. Section VI contains a brief discussion of policy
implications, and Section VII concludes. Additional details on the theoretical model,
conditional density estimation, and variable construction are available in appendices
A, B, and C respectively.
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II A Simple Two-Period Model of Medical Care
Demand
A Model Specification and Assumptions
The change in health can affect the individual’s optimization problem in two dis-
tinct ways. First, utility from contemporaneous health, H, and consumption, z, may
be reference dependent with respect to health in previous periods.2 For example, an
individual who had been wheelchair bound but is now able to walk with the aid of a
walker will feel better about her current health than someone in a similar walker who
in the prior period was running marathons. In addition, the individual who is experi-
encing a decline in health may get more or less utility from other consumption (e.g.,
a burrito, a tennis racket) than the individual who is experiencing an improvement in
health. The direction (sign) of the cross-partial derivative of utility from consumption
with respect to change in health is an empirical question.3 Denoting utility, U , and ,
A for the change in health from some prior reference point, we assume that ∂U(·)∂A ≥ 0,
or that the marginal effect of change in health on utility is increasing in the change in
health. Our assumption differs from much of the literature on reference-dependent pref-
erences, which typically assumes the utility function from gains and losses is S-shaped.
However, unlike wealth, health is bounded below by death. Strong loss aversion as
health approaches the minimum health threshold will make utility from losses concave.
Second, changes in health from a reference point provide noisy signals about future
health shocks.4 We incorporate this signal value into our two period model by making
2Evidence is mixed on whether reference points are formed using rational expectations (Koszegi and
Rabin, 2006) or adaptive expectations (Baucells et al., 2011). We use adaptive expectations, meaning
reference health is defined by recent health history. Behaviorally, this implies the individual’s reference
health is the level of health to which the individual is accustomed. When we talk about “change in health”
we mean change in health from this prior, reference health.
3The sign of the cross partial of utility from consumption and the state of health is also an empirical
question for which there is currently no consensus in the literature. See Edwards (2008) and Finkelstein
et al. (2009) for discussions and reviews of the empirical literature on health-dependent utility.
4Theoretical models of medical care demand that incorporate uncertainty in health (Cropper, 1977; Liljas,
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the health shock in the second period (δ2) a function of the change in health in the
first period, A1 (subscripts denote the time periods). We allow that
∂δ2
∂A1
≥ 0, or
that a negative (positive) change in health is associated with a future health decline
(improvement).
We make two additional modifications to the standard health production function in
the literature. First, we allow the level of health to be an element in health production,
α(·). We assume a concave relationship between health and health production: ∂α∂H ≥
1 and ∂
2α
∂H2
≤ 0. Given that co-morbidities reduce the effectiveness of medical care, the
marginal effect of medical care on health should be smaller when the individual is in
poor health. Second, we model health decay as an additive, periodic shock rather than
a multiplicative rate. Unlike the multiplicative specification, this specification allows
individuals in good and poor health to experience equally large (or small) changes in
health.5
Individuals enter the first period knowing their initial health and wealth. They
choose medical care and consumption to maximize first period utility and expected
second period utility. After their choice of medical care and consumption, individuals
experience a health shock prior to the end of the first period. At the end of the first
period individuals know the net effect of their health investment minus the shock,
and how their health has changed from referential initial health. First period health
also contributes to their second period health production function. By restricting
1998; Picone et al., 1998; Ehrlich, 2000; LaPorte and Ferguson, 2007) or of the productivity of medical care
(Dardanoni and Wagstaff, 1990) generally conclude that uncertainty results in a reserve stock of health
and otherwise does not change the implications of the models from a deterministic specification. Since
rigorously modeling uncertainty requires additional notation and mathematical complexity without resulting
in additional useful intuition we present a deterministic specification even though we heuristically discuss
uncertainty and incorporate uncertainty in the econometric implementation.
5The multiplicative functional form for health decline is common in the literature. However, this modeling
assumption predicts an asymptotic decline in health (like a gentle ski slope) as a higher rate multiplied by
declining health stock results in a smaller and smaller amount of health change. See Galama (2011) Figure 5
top left panel for an illustration of the decline in health from a simulation using the multiplicative functional
form for health decline. Modeling health decline as an amount rather than a rate is more consistent with
the observed longer duration of high health followed by a steeper decline in health towards the end of life
(like a cliff).
6
ending wealth to zero, the individual’s choice of medical care in the second period fully
determines their choice of consumption. The second period utility is then determined
by non-medical consumption, the resulting second period health, and the deviation of
this second period health from the average of initial and first period health.
With this timing of the model and end-point assumptions we can specify a fully
recursive utility function. For simplicity, we restrict second period wealth to zero, but
we allow for savings from the first period reflected in the Lagrangian multiplier, λR,
on the first period wealth constraint. Finally, in order to maintain the focus on the
change in health, we treat income, y, as exogenous. Modeling income as a function
of health would result in additional terms in the equilibrium condition reflecting the
marginal benefit of health to wealth without adding to the intuition on the mechanisms
associated with health dynamics. Details of the model and derivation of the equilibrium
conditions below are available in Appendix A.
B Equilibrium Conditions
Solving the model recursively, we derive the equilibrium conditions governing the
demand for medical care in the first period (first line) and second period (second line).6
(II.1)
∂α2
∂H1
(
∂U2
∂H2
+ ∂U2∂A2 − 12
∂U2/∂A2
∂α2/∂H1
)
+ ∂U1∂H1 +
∂U1
∂A1
= λ
RPm
∂α1/∂m1
+ ∂δ2∂A1
(
∂U2
∂H2
+ ∂U2∂A2
)
∂U2
∂H2
+ ∂U2∂A2 = P
m ∂U2/∂z2
∂α2/∂m2
In our simple two period model, the first expression in equation II.1 can be inter-
preted as the equilibrium demand for health investment comparable to equation (13)
from Grossman (1972), equation (13) from Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) or equation (15)
6See Kohn and Patrick (2012) for a complete discussion of the model specification, first and second order
conditions and comparative dynamics.
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from Galama (2011).7 In all of these models, a decline in health results in an increase
in the marginal benefits from health due to the assumption of concave utility. The crit-
ical difference is that in prior work, the rate of depreciation is added back to the cost
of health capital.8 As a result, higher rates of depreciation increase the cost of health
capital at the same time as the resulting lower level of health increases the marginal
benefits from health. There is no inevitable disequilibrium in the extant models that
could explain large investments in medical care.9
Our specification illustrates the mechanisms whereby different reference points
would elicit different amounts of medical care demand among individuals with the
same current level of health. Individuals with the same level of health may reach their
health state from different values in previous periods. Those experiencing a greater
decline in their health would have a greater marginal benefit to utility and thereby a
greater disequilibrium and greater demand for medical care than those with smaller
changes in their health.10 Again this reflects an intuition that individuals are better
able to adapt to small declines in their health than large ones (Groot, 2000). This
utility value of the change in health is magnified by the assumption that health is an
element in health production. Furthermore, if the change in health is a signal to future
7We agree with Galama (2011) that the first-order condition resulting from maximizing utility with
respect to health investment, can be interpreted equivalently as the equilibrium condition for the health
stock or for health investment.
8The corresponding notation in Grossman and Ehrlich and Chuma is δ and dt in Galama, both symbols
defined as a rate of depreciation that is independent of health but assumed to increase with age. These
three models all include the marginal effect of health on income (W, the wage rate, in Grossman and Ehrlich
and Chuma and the more general φH marginal production benefit of health to wealth in Galama). A
corresponding marginal benefit of health to wealth would appear in the same way in our specification if we
were to relax our assumption of exogenous income. Finally our model has abstracted from discounting and
time preference to simplify notation and focus on the change in health.
9Grossman notes the indeterminacy of medical care demand on p. 238: “. . . gross investment might
increase, remain constant, or decrease. This follows because a rise in the rate of depreciation not only reduces
the amount of health capital demanded by consumers but also reduces the amount of capital supplied to
them by a given amount of gross investment.”
10Although this implication differs from the standard S-shaped value in gains and losses from prospect
theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) posit examples where the value function may take different shapes.
One such example involves critical thresholds in wealth, i.e. a loss sufficient to lose a house. In our application,
health is bounded below by some minimum threshold necessary for life. Strong loss aversion near the death
point explains the increasing magnitude in marginal utility.
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changes, then this signal value further reduces the marginal cost of health investment.11
In our specification where health decline is modeled as an amount rather than a
rate, decline in health from a reference level causes an inevitable disequilibrium between
marginal benefits and marginal costs. Equilibrium can only be restored with increas-
ing amounts of medical care. The marginal productivity of medical care (∂α/∂m)
decreases with increasing amounts of medical care, reflecting diminishing returns to
health investment.12 Increasing consumption of medical care increases the cost of
health capital (right hand side) bringing costs into balance with increasing marginal
benefits (left hand side).
Allowing health to be an element in health production adds an additional term
to the utility value of health (the first term in equation II.1) or alternatively can be
subtracted from the cost of health.13 The marginal productivity of health to health
investment, (∂α2/∂H1), which is not modeled in most of the extant literature, increases
the inequality between marginal costs and benefits as health declines.
Comparing the equilibrium conditions for the two periods illustrates the difference
between forward looking (period 1 condition) and myopic (period 2) medical care de-
mand. The additional terms in the period one condition reflect the future value of
health investment in terms of future health production and the second-period signal
value. However, even without these forward looking terms, the gain/loss utility results
in different demands for medical care among individuals with the same level of health.
Finally, these equilibrium conditions can also explain the observation that indi-
viduals with the same level of health but different levels of wealth demand different
amounts of medical care. In both periods, higher levels of wealth result in lower costs
11We have modeled the health shock as a positive amount subtracted from health net of health investment.
Thus, this shock gets larger as health declines more resulting in a negative derivative. Alternatively, if the
health shock were modeled as a negative amount, then the derivative would be positive, but there would be
a preceding negative sign resulting in the same interpretation of the signal value of the change in health.
12We agree with Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Galama (2011) that the assumption of a diminishing
returns-to-scale health production function is necessary to ensure the determinacy of the model.
13This first term is unambiguously positive because ∂α/∂H ≥ 1 and therefore ∂U2∂A2 > 12
∂U2/∂A2
∂α2/∂H1
.
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of investment by reducing the numerators of the first cost term (the shadow price of
wealth declines with higher levels of wealth, and the marginal utility of consumption
declines with higher levels of consumption).14 Thus, the more wealth, the lower the
marginal costs of health investment and the greater the demand for medical care nec-
essary to achieve equilibrium. Furthermore, this wealth component in the equilibrium
demand also confirms that the demands for medical care and consumption should be
estimated jointly, rather than assumed separable.
The central hypothesis of this model is that individuals will demand more medical
care the greater their decline in health at any level of health, age, or wealth. This
mechanism can explain why relatively young and healthy individuals are observed in
the upper tail of the medical care spending distribution, and conversely why all old
and sick individuals are not in the top 5 percent.
III Econometric Implementation
Our specification captures how reference health and health dynamics affect the joint
decision to consume medical care and other consumption, and how this decision in turn
affects health in future periods.15 Our estimation strategy is chosen with an eye to
testing the key theoretical hypothesis of the model and simulating the full distribution
of medical care spending rather than merely estimating mean or median effects.
A Timing Assumptions
The timing of the empirical model is similar to that introduced in the theoretical
model in Section II. We assume that the individual enters each discrete period knowing
her exogenous characteristics, Xt, including age, gender, marital status, education, etc.
14Both period equilibrium conditions would have the same specification with λR had we not made the
simplifying assumption that R2=0 and instead included the wealth constraint in the second period.
15We also empirically model death as a probabilistic outcome of individuals’ health and medical care
consumption, but it is not the emphasis of our research.
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She also knows her endogenous health state, Ht, and all past realizations of health and
medical care consumption [Ht−k,mt−k]∀k ∈ {1, · · · , t}. The theoretical model shows
that an individual’s utility from health is reference dependent with respect to health
in prior periods. When we refer to “change in health” in this section, we refer to a
difference in contemporaneous health from the reference level of health as determined by
the individual’s health history. Specifically, change in health is the difference between
contemporaneous health and the average level of health from the prior two periods.16
Knowing their demographics, current and past health as well as the functional
forms on utility (unknown to the econometrician) for the health production function,
the individual then chooses medical care and consumption to maximize lifetime utility.
Because change from reference health is in the utility function, change in health is
included in the expressions for both the demand for consumption and the demand
for medical care.17 Thus, the joint demand for consumption and medical care can be
expressed as follows:
z∗t = z(Ht, At,mt−1, zt−1,Xt, 
z
t )
m∗t = m(Ht, At,mt−1, zt−1,Xt, 
m
t ), where
At = Ht − 1
p
p∑
i=1
Ht−i
(III.1)
where z,mt is a preference shock and p is the number of periods over which historical
health index values are averaged to form the reference level of health. These choices
16In preliminary examinations, we found that our results strengthen as we increase the number of periods
used to form the reference level of health (e.g., average of last three, four periods, etc.) However, including
more periods in the formation of reference health has a considerable effect on our sample size and worsens
the initial conditions problem. We therefore believe the results reported here may understate the importance
of reference health in explaining the top tail of medical care consumers.
17This specification is consistent Koszegi and Rabin (2006) where utility of consumption c, conditional on
reference point r is defined as: u(c|r) = m(c) + n(c|r), or the sum of utility of final consumption and the
gain/loss relative to the reference level.
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then affect health at the start of the next period:
(III.2) Ht+1 = α(Ht, At,mt, zt,Xt, 
H
t )
To maintain a reasonably parsimonious (and identifiable) model that focuses on the
effect of the change in health on predicting the top tail of the medical care spending
distribution, we do not model all of the possible mechanisms included in the literature.18
First, we do not model the choice of insurance. Insurance choice is clearly endogenous to
health status and the demand for medical care. However, insurance choice is also highly
constrained by employment (under age 65) and the presence of universal Medicare
coverage (over age 65) in addition to income (Medicaid eligibility). Second, in this
specification, we do not model endogenous labor market choice, particularly retirement.
We include variables on employment, insurance status, age, and income in the model.
Table IV contains the full list of variables included in each expression.
B Identification
The empirical identification of this model comes through three sources. First, we
make some intuitively reasonable exclusion restrictions. Our theoretical model implies
that the change in health from some reference level of health to which the individual is
accustomed, affects the demand for medical and non-medical goods. However, for pre-
dicting the health transition, the information from the individual’s health history and
lagged consumption of medical and non-medical goods is captured by the individual’s
contemporaneous health state. Conditional on the individual’s realized contemporane-
ous health state, only current period consumption of medical and non-medical goods
and a stochastic shock will determine the individual’s health in the next period. Sim-
ilarly, the individual’s income and wealth should affect her demand for medical and
18See Hugonnier et al. (2013) Table 3 for an excellent summary of the major modeling choices in much of
the literature.
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non-medical goods, but not otherwise affect her health in the next period.
Second, the model is identified through the timing. However, to appeal to the
timing assumption, we must specify endogenous initial conditions for the health states
that form the reference level and initial demand for medical and non-medical goods:
H1 = H
i
1(X1,X
i)
H2 = H
i
2(X2,X
i, H1)
m2 = m
i
2(X2,X
i, H1)
z2 = z
i
2(X2,X
i, H1)
(III.3)
Xi is a set of variables only included in the initial conditions: whether the respondent
was a veteran, the respondent’s number of living parents, the current/final age of those
parents, and a vector of occupational stress measures. Ceteris paribus, individuals who
worked in occupations which were more physically demanding, required heavy lifting, or
exposed them to more environmental risk should have worse health and be consuming
more medical care at the time we first observe them. Details on the construction of
these occupational stress measures are discussed further in Appendix C. See Table
IV for the variables in each equation. Finally, some identification is attained by the
non-linearity of all expressions in the model.
C Conditional Density Estimation
We employ Conditional Density Estimation (CDE) to estimate the joint distribution
of medical care expenses, consumption, the health transition, and initial conditions
(Gilleskie and Mroz, 2004). For our purposes, CDE provides three advantages. First,
CDE enables us to match any moment of the distribution of each variable, not just the
conditional mean or conditional median. Second, CDE does not require parametric
assumptions on the distribution of the error terms, enabling us to flexibly model left
or right skewed distributions. (Section IV shows that both medical care spending and
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consumption are left skewed while health is right skewed.) Third, CDE permits the
marginal effect of explanatory variables (including change in health) to vary over the
support of the dependent variable for each equation in the model. In other words, we
can capture whether the change in health may have a stronger effect in the top tail of
the distribution of medical care consumption than at the mean. These features of CDE
make it well suited for our research objective, to explain the top tail of the medical
care spending distribution. Additional details on CDE are contained in Appendix B.
D Discrete Factor Random Effects
For each expression, we utilize a flexible random effects estimation technique that
permits time-invariant and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity without imposing
distributional assumptions on the error term. We approximate the joint distribution
of both permanent and time-varying unobservables with a step function (Heckman
and Singer, 1984). In Monte Carlo simulations, the discrete factor random effects
estimator has been shown to reduce bias relative to the assumption of joint normality
in the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (Mroz, 1999).
We include a time-invariant, permanent unobserved heterogeneity component that
may influence an individual’s joint choice of medical care and non-medical consump-
tion, and subsequent health transitions. For example, individuals who heavily value
the future may be likely to invest in more medical care, engage in lower consumption,
and enjoy persistently good health. Alternatively, individuals who are genetically pre-
disposed to poor health may consume more medical care and experience more rapidly
deteriorating health. Empirically, the distribution of medical care spending is strongly
persistent within individuals over time, and modeling this unobserved heterogeneity
will help us capture that (French and Jones, 2004; Cohn and Yu, 2012; Kohn and Liu,
2013).19 The time varying component of heterogeneity is meant to capture changes
19Skewness and persistence within individuals are features of both total and out-of-pocket expenditures
in the U.S. despite a population uninsurance rates near 10 percent.
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that affect unobservable factors on a per-period basis. Hypothetically, if an individual
is battling depression, she may consume less medical care, consume less non-medical
goods and experience deterioration in health. We can therefore decompose the errors
in each equation into three components:
(III.4) jt = µ
j + νjt + e
j
t ∀j ∈ z,m,H
where µj captures the permanent heterogeneity for each expression, νjt captures the
time-varying component, and ejt represents the remaining i.i.d. Type-1 Extreme Value
error necessary to formulate the logit hazard probabilities. Errors for the initial condi-
tions expressions do not include time-varying heterogeneity as they are only observed
once.
The likelihood function includes eight expressions: the per-period demand for med-
ical care, non-medical consumption, the health transition equation, a per-period prob-
ability of death, two initial conditions equations for health (initial health and second
period health, in order to formulate the two period health history) and initial conditions
for the demand for medical care and consumption. Our actual estimation procedure
therefore consists of a joint CDE estimation nested in a finite mixture framework. The
individual’s contribution to the likelihood function can be expressed as:
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Li(Θ,Ψ,Π) =
K∑
k=1
pik
[
Jh1∏
jh1=1
P (H1 = jh1|µH1k )1(H1=jh1)
Jh2∏
jh2=1
P (H2 = jh2|µH2k )1(H2=jh2)
×
Jm2∏
jm2=1
P (m2 = jm2|µm2k )1(m2=jm2)
Jz2∏
jz2=1
P (z2 = jz2|µz2k )1(z2=jz2)
×
Ti∏
t=3
L∑
l=1
ψl
[ Jm∏
jm=1
P (mt = jm|µmk , νmlt )1(mt=jm)
Jz∏
jz=1
P (zt = jz|µzk, νzlt)1(zt=jz)
×
JH∏
jH=1
P (Ht = jm|µHk , νHlt )1(Ht=jH)
1∏
D=0
p(death = D|µDk , νDlt )1(death=D)
]]
(III.5)
where Θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated from equations III.1, III.2, and
III.3; ψl are the mixing parameters for the time-varying heterogeneity, and pik are the
mixing parameters for the permanent heterogeneity. K and L represent the number
of mass points for the distribution of permanent and time-varying heterogeneity, re-
spectively; and t indexes the waves in the data for each individual. The terminal time,
specified Ti, reflects that not all individuals are observed in the sample for the same
number of periods. Jh1, Jh2, Jm2, Jz2 , Jz, Jm, and JH are the number of cells for each
conditional density estimation.
IV Data
We estimate the model using the RAND files of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), a longitudinal biennial panel survey of individuals 50 years old and over, from
1992-2010. The HRS is well suited for our purposes as it contains data on all the
relevant variables over a sample period sufficient to capture the dynamic evolution of
health, demand for medical care, and consumption. However, the HRS is limited in
that it excludes those under age 50, so we are unable to fully capture the population-
wide age distribution of the top 5 percent of medical care consumers, of which nearly
16
40 percent were younger than 55 in 2009 (Schoenman, 2012).
In order to estimate the model with valid initial conditions, we restrict the sample to
those individuals who are observed for at least three periods. With this restriction, we
have a sample of 173,312 observations comprised of 25,872 individuals. Table I contains
information on the number of individuals we observe for a given number of waves.
We observe individuals for an average of 7 waves. Summary statistics of our sample
are available in Table II. A few characteristics of the sample are worth mentioning.
Particularly for their generation, the individuals in the sample are well educated, with
68 percent of the sample graduating high school and 18 percent graduating from college.
Also, most individuals in the sample had stable careers, with an average tenure in their
longest held occupation of over 20 years. Also note that annual consumption exceeds
annual income. This is reasonable because the median individual in the sample is past
retirement age and presumably dissaving.
RAND HRS includes two measures of medical care expenditures: out-of-pocket
medical care expenditures and total medical care expenditures. We use out-of-pocket
medical care expenditures for three reasons. First, the total medical expenditure in-
formation was collected by asking respondents about the amount of total medical care
expenditures they thought they incurred, without any external validation for the an-
swers provided. As insured individuals are notoriously insulated from their true total
costs, the variation around reported out-of-pocket expenditures was very large and
seemingly random.20 Second, total medical expenditures are documented only for the
first six waves, so using total medical expenditures would halve the number of obser-
vations. Third, because we are concerned with the individual’s optimization problem,
the out-of-pocket expense reflects the cost to the individual. Even with insurance those
over (under) 65 still spend approximately 16 percent (10 percent) of disposable income
on medical care (Desmond et al., 2007; Banthin and Bernard, 2010).
20Reported total medical expenditures has 16 times the variance of out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
The two variables share a correlation coefficient of 0.14
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The RAND HRS files include many categorical variables for level of difficulties
with activities of daily living (ADL’s), instrumental activities of daily living (IADL’s),
chronic conditions, self-reported health, and other data on the respondent’s health. We
convert these discrete categorical variables into a single index of “health” using Multi-
ple Correspondence Analysis (MCA).21 Index variables and weights used to construct
this measure are in Table III.22 The transformation of several discrete indicators into a
continuous index reduces the impact of problematic unobservable cut-point and adap-
tion heterogeneity often associated with self-assessed health and other discrete health
measures.23 In addition, a single health index makes computing the change in health
more tractable.
We calculate consumption of the aggregate good by subtracting change in non-
housing financial wealth and out-of-pocket medical expenses from income. This calcu-
lated variable represents consumption-net-of-savings. However as most individuals in
the data set are approaching or past retirement age, dissaving is more common than
saving. Additionally, we cannot capture the effects of capital gains. 24
We are primarily interested in estimating the conditional joint distributions of three
variables: health status, out-of-pocket medical care expenditures, and non-medical care
consumption. From the descriptive statistics and the graphs of the kernel densities of
these variables (see Figure 1), we see that the distributions of medical care expendi-
tures and non-medical consumption are skewed left, but the distribution of the health
index is skewed right. These observations are intuitive. Most people are fairly healthy
and medical care expenditures and consumption are driven by right-tailed income and
21MCA is used to transform discrete variables into a single continuous variable, whereas Principal Compo-
nents Analysis is used to transform continuous variables into a single continuous variable. See Kohn (2012)
for a full description of the MCA health index methodology.
22There is considerable multimodality at the top of the health index distribution as many individuals
report having just one ADL, or one chronic health condition, or “very good” health.
23See Contoyannis et al. (2004) for a full discussion of the problems associated with self-assessed health.
24The median person in our sample has non-housing financial wealth of $10,500 and a person in the 90th
percentile of wealth has $250,000 in non-housing financial assets. Except for the upper tail of the wealth
distribution, unobserved capital gains are a minimal concern in calculating consumption.
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wealth distributions. These skewed distributions underscore the importance of model-
ing the full distribution, rather estimating the conditional mean. In our sample, the
top 5 percent of medical care consumers account for 46 percent of all medical care,
consistent with the population observation that motivates our study.
V Results
Parameter estimates from the joint CDE estimation are in Tables V-IX. We have
estimated the model with three mass points in the support of permanent heterogene-
ity and two points of time-varying heterogeneity.25 Overall, we fit the highly skewed
distributions of medical care, consumption, and health reasonably well (see Figure 1).
Because the estimates are for parameters in non-linear hazard probabilities they are
not directly interpretable without numerical simulation. We therefore discuss the key
marginal effects below. Tables X and XI report marginal effects for the balance of the
variables of interest. Recall that one benefit of using CDE is that we can estimate
marginal effects at different points of the distribution of the dependent variable. Some
of the variation in these marginal effects stems from explanatory variables having differ-
ent local effects on the probability of being observed in a given part of the distribution.
Tables V-IX therefore contain three parameter estimates for each variable of interest.
For some variables, the marginal effect is positive in the low end of the distribution of
the dependent variable, and negative in the top portion of that same distribution, or
vice versa.26 For each variable in each expression, we report three marginal effects: one
for the effect of the explanatory variable in the lowest quartile of the dependent vari-
25Adding additional mass points does not significantly imcrease the likelihood function, as vetted with an
LR test (p-value = 0.21).
26Marginal effects are calculated by replicating each observation in the data 80 times. We forward simulate
the data using the observed values of the exogenous variables and estimated parameters of the model. We
then change a variable of interest, and re-simulate the data still using the estimated parameters of the model
and holding all other exogenous variables fixed. Continuous variables are increased by adding 10 percent to
their previous value. Marginal effects of binary variables are calculated by simulating twice - once with all
observations set to zero, once with all observations set with a value of one.
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able, one for the effect of the explanatory variable in the top quartile of the dependent
variable, and a third marginal effect for the interquartile range. Each marginal effect
is the mean percentage change in the value of the dependent variable, conditional on
the dependent variable being observed in that quartile.
For interpretation, consider the marginal effect of having insurance on medical care
consumption (left column of Table X). The marginal effect of having insurance on
out-of-pocket medical care expenditures is negative (-3.1 percent) among those who
are in the lowest quartile of medical care consumers. The marginal effect of having
insurance on out-of-pocket medical expenditures is still negative in the interquartile
range (-2.6 percent), but positive in the top quartile of medical care consumers. We
interpret this as evidence that the price elasticity of medical care demand may be
increasing in individuals’ medical care expenditures. Alternatively, those who spend
the most on care may also face the most binding budget constraint. To take another
example, the effect of education on medical care expenditures is negative across the
distribution, consistent with education increasing health productivity. The magnitude
of the marginal effect of education increases from -1.0 percent at the bottom quartile
to -11.5 percent at the top. This monotonic but non-linear effect over the distribution
is intuitive as those who spend more have more to gain (or in this case save) by being
more savvy and productive consumers of medical care.
A Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Reference Health
The critical finding is that even after controlling for contemporaneous health, ref-
erence health significantly affects the demand for medical care.27 By simulating the
model, we find that a 10 percent decline in health from reference health results in a
22 percent increase in the probability that an individual is in the top 5 percent of
27In the kernel of expression that enters the hazard probability in CDE, the arguments for Ht and At are
additively separable. At, change in health, is the difference between Ht and reference health. Conditional
on current health, the effect of a decrease in health is therefore algebraically equivalent to the effect of an
increased level reference health.
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medical care consumers. Over the entire distribution of medical care demand, a 10
percent decline in health from reference level health increases expected medical care
consumption by 14 percent. We also find that the effect of a change in health from
reference levels on demand for medical care is increasing in the size of the change. A
one percentage point decline in health leads to a 2 percent increase in the probability
of being in the top 5 percent, and an overall 1.3 percent increase in expected medical
expenditures. However, a 20 percentage point decline in health leads to a substantially
larger 48 percent probability of being observed in the top 5 percent, and a 31.2 percent
increase in overall medical care expenditures. The marginal effects of an improvement
in health are smaller in magnitude than those of a decline. A 10 percentage point
improvement in health decreases the probability that an individual is observed in the
top 5 percent by 19 percent, and overall medical expenditures decrease by 13 percent.
All of these results are consistent with loss aversion, as advanced by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979).
For perspective, we compare the effects of a change in health to the pure effect of
contemporaneous health alone. If we decrease contemporaneous health and reference
health by 10 percent (thereby holding At constant) the probability that in individual is
observed in the top 5 percent of the medical care spending distribution increases by 44
percent. Thus, the level of health is clearly important, but reference health and health
dynamics compound the effect of contemporaneous poor health on high medical care
demand.
B Matching the Individuals and Demographics of the Top
5 Percent
In order to determine which individuals are likely to be in the top 5 percent of
medical care consumers, we again simulate the model, replicating each observation in
the data 80 times. In simulation, we use the model to generate predictions and then
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compare the predictions of the model to the observed data.28 From a policy perspective,
the primary contribution of our model and empirics is improved prediction of dynamic
health investment and matching the top 5 percent of medical care consumers. For
comparison, a lagged dependent variable regression of medical care consumption on
the exact same arguments used in CDE yields an overall R-squared of 0.06. In other
words, at the conditional mean, the covariates available to us explain 6 percent of the
variation in medical care consumption. Using 6 percent as a bench mark, our model
represents improvement if it generates a match rate that is 6 percent greater than
random.
Simulating the model as described above, our model generates a 14.5 percent match
rate between predicted and observed individuals in the top 5 percent of medical care
consumers. We also have estimated this model under a specification consistent with
the Grossman model, one which does not include a reference level of health, nor lagged
medical care or aggregate consumption. This specification where only contemporane-
ous state variables enter the utility function generates an 8.5 percent match rate of
predicted and observed individuals in the top 5 percent of medical care. Therefore, our
model outperforms the Grossman-consistent model in matching by 65 percent.
To gauge our model’s effectiveness in fitting the full distribution of medical care
consumption, we create an indicator variable for whether an individual’s predicted
medical care consumption is within a 10 percentile range of the individual’s observed
medical care consumption. For our model, this +/- 10 percentile match rate is 36
over the top quartile and 29 percent over the total distribution. When an individual’s
predicted and observed health indices are within 10 percentiles of one another, the
match rate for the top quartile improves to 41 percent and total match rate improves
28We randomly draw each replication’s permanent type for all periods, a time-varying joint shock for each
period, and an idiosyncratic draw from the uniform distribution. We then use the individual’s exogenous
variables and the estimated parameters of the model to forward simulate the individual’s health state tran-
sitions and decisions to consume medical care and non-medical goods. We compare the averaged outcomes
of these simulated individuals to the observed decisions and outcomes in the data.
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to 32 percent.
One of the primary motivations for including reference health in the utility function
is to help explain why individuals who are relatively young and healthy are among the
top 5 percent. To gauge the model’s effectiveness in capturing this phenomenon, we
compare the summary statistics for individuals predicted to fall in the top 5 percent
by our model and a Grossman-consistent model to the observed data. These summary
statistics are exhibited in Table XII. We match the observed data more closely than
the Grossman-consistent model on most dimensions. We more closely match the mean
age in the top 5 percent. Our predicted mean age in the top 5 percent is three years
younger than the Grossman-consistent model, thus, we better match young people in
the top 5 percent. We also better match relatively healthy people in the top 5 percent.
In the observed data, mean health among the top 5 percent of medical care consumers
is 0.636, compared to our predicted mean health in the top 5 percent of 0.456 and the
Grossman-consistent prediction of only 0.26.
C Empirical Evidence on Complimentarity of Medical Care,
Health, and Consumption
Previous literature has found conflicting results on how the individual’s health state
affects the marginal utility of consumption (see Finkelstein et al. (2009), p. 117 for a
review). Edwards (2008) and DiNardi et al. (2010) find a negative cross-partial between
health and marginal utility from consumption suggesting the two are substitutes, while
Finkelstein et al. (2013) and Viscusi and Evans (1990) find a positive cross-partial
suggesting complementarity. This is not surprising, given than an increase in health
may yield two separate effects on the individual’s solution to her optimization problem.
First, health may positively affect the utility from consumption (the fries taste better
because I am healthier). However, health may reduce observed consumption via the
dynamic budget constraint. Ceteris paribus, if individuals are consumption smoothing
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and expect to live longer, we expect them to consume less today. Empirically, the effect
of health on consumption should be determined by which effect dominates.
In our model, reference health and change from reference health are defined entirely
by health dynamics. While the effects of reference health are our primary focus, the
dynamics of health in and of themselves, yield auxiliary evidence on the complimentar-
ity of health and consumption. By including both contemporaneous health and health
dynamics in our expression for the demand for consumption, we find evidence of com-
plimentarity and effects through the dynamic budget constraint. Specifically, we find
that a 10 percent improvement in health leads to a 4 percent reduction in consumption,
but that a 10 percent increase in current and previous health leads to a 3.5 percent in-
crease in consumption. The latter supports the hypothesis that health and consumption
are complements, whereas the former result is consistent with consumption-smoothing
individuals operating under a dynamic budget constraint. Recall that most of the indi-
viduals in the HRS are very near or past retirement. The only way to fund additional
years of life is by reducing consumption. A positive change in health should predict
lower consumption due to greater expected longevity. However, the positive effect of
level health on consumption suggests health and consumption are compliments. In
other words, our results suggest that health and consumption are complements, but
that the effect may be offset by health dynamics. Individuals experiencing an improve-
ment in health may not consume as much as one would expect, due to the offsetting
effect of the dynamic budget constraint.
VI Discussion
Our theory and empirical findings both help explain the stylized facts about who
consumes high amounts of medical care. Recall that not all of these high users of
medical care are old and sick, and not all those who are old and sick are high users.
The key empirical finding is that conditional on current health, a 10 percent higher
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reference health makes individuals 22 percent more likely to be in the top 5 percent of
medical care consumers. Our analysis suggests that relatively (un)healthy high users
of medical care are distinguished from other relatively (un)healthy non-users by the
level of health to which they are accustomed.
As with the variation in health status, our finding on the change in health can
explain why although individuals over 65 are more likely to be in the top 5 percent, not
all those over 65 are in the top 5 percent. Our analysis suggests that those seniors who
experience larger losses in health are more likely to be in the top 5 percent, and those
who were already in poor health are more likely still. Furthermore, the combination
of large decreases in health, lower levels of health, and strong loss aversion as health
approaches the minimum threshold among individuals at older ages can explain the
observed increase in medical care when additional longevity is doubtful.
A focus on the change from reference health as a predictor of high medical care
expenses has several policy implications. First, focusing on the change in health pro-
vides support for recent efforts to reduce frailty and support so-called healthy aging
(Siven, 2012 and references therein). If seniors experience more gradual declines in
their health, then they are more likely to stay out of the top 5 percent of medical
care users. Second, while it is important to make sure that chronic conditions are
well managed so that they do not “spike into acute conditions, our findings suggest
additional focus on managing newly diagnosed health problems. For example, it may
be that those who have been in good health but experience a significant health shock
are less efficient in navigating the medical care system and thereby end up in the top
5 percent. Third, incorporating reference health into models of medical care demand
has the potential to improve financial and operational forecasting, which can improve
the efficiency of insurance products and medical care facilities.
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VII Conclusion
We offer new theoretical and empirical insights into the predictors of high medical
care expending. The distribution of medical care spending is highly skewed, with the
top 5 percent accounting for nearly 50 percent of expenditures. Most previous work
that estimates the distribution of medical care spending takes a classical approach.
We find evidence that subjective and behavioral factors play a significant role in de-
termining high medical expenditures. Specifically, our theoretical model suggests that
the reference health can help to explain high medical care spending and better predict
who will be high medical spenders. We find that individuals’ medical care demand
responds more strongly to losses than gains in health. We find that while reference
health (or health dynamics) significantly affects medical care spending at all levels, the
effects of reference health are particularly helpful in determining medical care usage
at the top of the distribution. Using data from the HRS, the marginal effect of a 10
percent decline in health from reference levels is a 22 percent increase in the probabil-
ity of being in the top 5 percent. Moreover, holding the 10 percent decline in health
constant, but reducing the levels of both reference and current health by 10 percent
increases the probability of being in the top 5 percent by 44 percent. When health
states are close in the dynamic prediction of the model, we match the individuals in
the top quartile of medical consumers at 41 percent and the top 5 percent at 18 per-
cent. We believe further examination of behavioral factors that determine medical care
consumption can uncover why a small number of people spend such large amounts on
care. Understanding the behavior of these high spenders is the key to bending the cost
curve.
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A Theoretical Details
We define the utility U , change in health A, health H and wealth R in each period,
as follows:
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U1 = u(z1, H1, A1)
A1 = H1 −H0
= α1(m1, H0)− δ1
H1 = α1(m1, H0)− δ1
R1 = r1R0 + y1 + P
m
1 m1 − z1
(A.1)
where the subscripts indicate time, α(·) is the health production function, and u(·) is
the utility function. We can therefore express second period utility, health, change in
health, and wealth in terms of first period state variables and choices:
(A.2)
U2 = u(z2, H2, A2)
H2 = α2(m2, H1)− δ2(A1)
= α2(m2, (α1(m1, H0)− δ1))− δ2((α1(m1, H0)− δ1)−H0)
A2 = H2 − 12(H1 +H0)
=
[
α2(m2, H1)− δ2(A1)
]− 12((α1(m1, H0)− δ1) +H0)
=
[
α2(m2, (α1(m1, H0)− δ1))− δ2((α1(m1, H0)− δ1)−H0)
]
− 12
(
(α1(m1, H0)− δ1) +H0
)
R2 = r2R1 + y2 − Pm2 m2 − z2 = 0
and the following additional constraints:
(A.3)
H0 > Hmin
H2 > Hmin
R0 > 0
R2 ≥ 0
A0 = 0
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yielding a fully recursive specification:
(A.4)
max
m1,m2,z1
∑
t U(zz, Ht, At) =
u
[
(r2R1 + y2 − Pm2 m2), α2(m2, (α1(m1, H0)− δ1))− δ2((α1(m1, H0)− δ1)−H0),[
α2(m2, (α1(m1, H0)− δ1))− δ2((α1(m1, H0)− δ1)−H0)
]
− 12
(
(α1(m1, H0)− δ1) +H0
)]
+ u
[
z1, (α1(m1, H0)− δ1),
(
(α1(m1, H0)− δ1)−H0
)]
+ λR(r1R0 + y1 − Pmm1 − z1)
where λR is the Lagrangian multiplier on the first period wealth constraint. We can
first express first order conditions for medical care in periods 1 and 2 as:
Period 1:
∂U2
∂H2
∂H2
∂α2
∂α2
∂H1
∂H1
∂α1
∂α1
∂m1
+
∂U2
∂H2
∂H2
∂δ2
∂δ2
∂A1
∂A1
∂H1
∂H1
∂α1
∂α1
∂m1
+ 2 ∗ ∂U2
∂A2
∂A2
∂H2
∂H2
∂α2
∂α2
∂H1
∂H1
∂α1
∂α1
∂m1
+
∂U2
∂A2
∂A2
∂H2
∂H2
∂δ2
∂δ2
∂A1
∂A1
∂H1
∂H1
∂α1
∂α1
∂m1
+
∂U2
∂A2
∂A2
∂H1
∂H1
∂α1
∂α1
∂m1
+
∂U1
∂H1
∂H1
∂α1
∂α1
m1
+
∂U1
∂A1
∂A1
∂H1
∂H1
∂α1
∂α1
∂m1
= λRPm
Period 2:
∂U2
∂H2
∂H2
∂α2
∂α2
∂m2
+
∂U2
∂A2
∂A2
∂H2
∂H2
∂α2
∂α2
∂m2
= Pm
∂U2
∂z2
(A.5)
To simplify the above expression, we first recognize that:
(A.6)
∂A2
∂H2
=
∂A1
∂H1
=
∂H2
∂α2
=
∂H1
∂α1
;
∂H2
∂δ2
= −1; ∂A2
∂H1
= −1
2
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and we can therefore rewrite the expressions in equation A.5 as:
λRPm =
∂U2
H2
∂α2
∂H1
∂α1
∂m1
+
∂U2
∂A2
∂α2
∂H1
∂α1
∂m1
− ∂U2
∂H2
∂δ2
∂A1
∂α1
∂m1
− ∂U2
∂A2
∂δ2
∂A1
∂α1
∂m1
− 1
2
∂U2
∂A2
∂α1
∂m1
+
∂U1
∂H1
∂α1
∂m1
+
∂U1
∂A1
∂α1
∂m1
Pm
∂U2
∂z2
=
∂U2
∂H2
∂α2
∂m2
+
∂U2
∂A2
∂α2
∂m2
(A.7)
Combining terms in equation A.7 and diving through by the marginal productivity
of medical care ∂αt/∂mt; t = 1, 2 enables us to place the marginal benefit to medical
care on the left hand side and the marginal cost of the right.
∂α2
∂H1
(
∂U2
∂H2
+
∂U2
∂A2
− 1
2
∂U2/∂A2
∂α2/∂H1
)
+
∂U1
∂H1
+
∂U1
∂A1
=
λRPm
∂α1/∂m1
+
∂δ2
∂A1
(
∂U2
∂H2
+
∂U2
∂A2
)
∂U2
∂H2
+
∂U2
∂A2
= Pm
∂U2/∂z2
∂α2/∂m2
(A.8)
B Conditional Density Estimation
CDE utilizes a sequence of conditional logit probability functions to approximate
the density of the outcome of interest. First, we divide each variable of interest, y, into
K quantiles containing equal numbers of observations in each “cell. For each interval,
the kth interval is defined by [yk−1, yk). We define y0 as the smallest observation
and yK = ∞. Following Gilleskie and Mroz (2004), we can express the conditional
probability that the random variable Y falls into the first interval as:
(B.1) λ(1, x) = p[y0 ≤ Y < y1|x] =
∫ y1
y0
f(y|x)dy
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Similarly, the probability that Y falls in the kth interval can be expressed as:
(B.2) p[yk−1 ≤ Y < yk|x] =
∫ yk
yk−1
f(y|x)dy
The conditional probability that the dependent variable is observed in the kth in-
terval, given that it is not observed in intervals 1 through k − 1 can be expressed
as:
(B.3) λ(k, x) = p[yk−1 ≤ Y < yk|x, Y ≥ yk−1] =
∫ yk
yk−1
f(y|x)dy
1− ∫ yk−1y0 f(y|x)dy
Thus, the λ(k, x) serves as a discrete hazard function, given the cut points k, the
upper and lower bounds on Y and covariates x. As a hazard function, the probability
that Y falls into the kth interval is given by:
(B.4) p[yk−1 ≤ Y < yk|x] = λ(k, x)
k−1∏
j=1
[1− λj, x]
As suggested by Gilleskie and Mroz (2004), we use a sequence of logit probabilities
to form the hazard function, and thus the probability that our random variables of
interest fall into a given cell. Additionally, we interact each covariatex with a function
of the interval number, γk = −ln(K − k) and γ2k . These interactions between the γ
terms and the covariates are what permit the marginal effect of the variable of interest
to vary over the support of the dependent variable. For each expression in equations
III.1-III.2 and for each cell k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we can form a linear function of our
covariates and γ terms:
(B.5) gj(k, x) = Xjβj1 +X
jγkβ
j
2 +X
jγ2kβ
j
3 + 
j
t ∀j ∈ {z,m,H,H1, H2, z2,m2}
With some abuse of notation, Xj is inclusive of all variables in expression j. We
can therefore form the logit probabilities used to form the hazard function as:
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(B.6) λj(k, x) =
eg
j(k,x)
1 + egj(k,x)
and these terms are subsequently combined to form the estimable probabilities in
equation B.4.
C Formation of Occupational Demands
The RAND HRS files contains limited information on respondents’ employment
history: a categorical response where individuals’ self-identify as having primarily been
engaged in one of 17 occupations and a variable for how long the individual held
that occupation. The coarse occupation categories listed in the HRS correspond to
subgroups of occupations from the 1980 Census Occupation Codes.
Data on the indices of occupational demands come from the 1991 Dictionary of
Occupational Titles.29 The DOT is produced by the department of labor and was de-
signed to provide information on the skills/abilities required to perform an occupation.
The DOT contains information on 12,686 “occupations” that are better characterized
as ‘tasks’. A supplement to the 1991 DOT contains information on the demands occu-
pations place on individuals. There is a 5-category rating for required strength: Seden-
tary, Light, Medium, Heavy, and Very Heavy, corresponding to lifting/manipulating
varying weights on the job with varying frequency. We numerically code Sedentary
occupations with a strength requirement of 1 and a Very Heavy occupation with a
strength requirement of 5.
In addition to strength, the DOT also contains information on the frequency with
which occupations require climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling,
29The 1991 DOT had changed little from the 1977 edition of the DOT. While there are newer, better data
sets on occupational requirements (e.g., the O*NET) the 1977-1991 DOT is more relevant to the time where
individuals in the HRS were working.
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reaching and handling. For each occupation, each requirement was coded with one of
the following values:
0 = Not required
1 = Required up to 1/3 of the time
2 = Required between 1/3 - 2/3 of the time
3 = Required more than 2/3 of the time
(C.1)
To form the numerical measure of physical demands of a given DOT occupation, we
take the average over the numerical values assigned to each of the strength values in
that occupation.
The DOT also contains information on the frequency with which occupations ex-
pose individuals to various adverse environmental conditions or other occupational
hazards, including: weather, extreme cold, extreme heat, humidity, noise levels, vi-
bration, poor breathing conditions, proximity to moving mechanical parts, electrical
shock, unprotected heights, radiation, explosives, and caustic chemicals. These occu-
pational hazards are coded with the same frequency values as the physical demands.
The hazard exposure index for a DOT occupation is calculated by averaging over the
reported frequencies for each occupation.
The job requirements supplement to the 1991 DOT also details which 1980 Census
Occupation Code encompasses each DOT occupation. Calculating an HRS occupation
index value is then a matter of averaging the strength, non-strength physical, and
hazard exposure numeric values over all DOT occupations within each COC/HRS
occupation.
The HRS also reports the amount of time a respondent worked in their selected
occupation. If individuals who worked in physically intensive or hazardous occupations
have more worn bodies by the time we observe them in the sample, individuals who
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worked more years in these arduous occupations should have more proverbial miles
on them. We therefore multiply the HRS occupation values for strength required,
physical demands, and hazard exposure by the respondent’s reported number of years
worked in that occupation. It should be noted that these variables, used for exclusion
restrictions in initial conditions are intended as ordinal, rather than cardinal variables.
The interpretation of having a hazard exposure of “5” is irrelevant. For our purposes,
it is sufficient that individuals who have worked more years in more hazardous/arduous
occupations experience better/worse health and higher/lower medical expenditures at
the time of first observation.
Table I: Number of Observations Per Individual
Number of Individuals Number of Waves Observed
2,389 3
4,568 4
1,856 5
1,778 6
4,380 7
1,381 8
2,355 9
7,120 10
Total Individuals Average Observations Per Individual
25,827 6.949
The relatively high numbers of individuals observed for 4 & 7
are due to HRS adding respondents at waves 7 and 4 respectively
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Table II: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Demographic Variables
Female 0.575 0.494 0 1
Black 0.145 0.352 0 1
Hispanic 0.087 0.282 0 1
Other Non-White 0.021 0.142 0 1
Health Index 0.767 0.172 0 1
Age 67.190 10.526 50 109
Married 0.635 0.481 0 1
Widowed 0.192 0.394 0 1
Number of Children 3.166 1.977 0 8
Western Region 0.168 0.374 0 1
Midwest Region 0.240 0.427 0 1
Northeast Region 0.159 0.365 0 1
Number of Living Parents 0.272 0.530 0 2
Mothers Age (or Age at Death) 75.263 14.944 16 113
Fathers Age (or Age at Death) 71.390 14.397 12 113
Death 0.061 0.239 0 1
Education/Human Capital
Highest Grade Completed 12.086 3.349 0 17
High School Graduate 0.693 0.461 0 1
Attended College (1+ years) 0.382 0.486 0 1
College Graduate 0.180 0.385 0 1
Tenure at longest job (years) 20.728 11.842 0 1
Veteran 0.237 0.423 0 1
Strength Required (primary occupation) 0.654 0.925 0 7
Physical Demand (primary occupation) 1.370 8.492 0 6
Exposure Factors (primary occupation) 0.291 0.284 0 3
Financial Information
Insured 0.872 0.344 0 1
Non-Housing Wealth (100K units) 0.942 2.223 0 15.02
Annual Income (100K units, top coded) 0.491 0.538 0 5
Annual Out of pocket med. exp. (100K units) 0.029 0.102 0 12.06
Calculated Annual Consumption (100K units) 0.661 0.464 0 12.04
Individuals in Data Set 25,872
T Number of Observations 173,312
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Table III: Health Index Weights
Variable Weight
Self-Assessed Health
Excellent 1.241
Very Good 0.802
Good 0.145
Fair -1.056
Poor -2.810
Index of Activities of Daily Living
0 0.392
1 -1.677
2 -2.497
3 -3.00
4 -3.401
5 -3.489
Number of Chronic Health Conditions
0 1.079
1 0.568
2 -0.047
3 -0.729
4 -1.484
5 -2.418
6 -3.277
7 -4.306
8 -4.317
CESD Mental & Emotional Index
0 0.807
1 0.180
2 -0.467
3 -0.947
4 -1.227
5 -1.539
6 -1.987
7 -2.501
8 -2.854
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Table IV: Table of Variables Included in each CDE expression
Per-period Per-period Per-period Initial Initial Initial
Variable Med. Care Cons. Health Med. Care Cons. Health
Age X X X X X X
Age2 X X X X X X
Black X X X X X X
Female X X X X X X
Education X X X X X X
Region Indicators X X X X X X
# of Kids X X X X X
Insured X X X X X
Married X X X X X
Income X X X X
Wealth X X X X
Ht X X X
At X X X
mt−1 X X
zt−1 X X
mt X
zt X
Ht ∗ zt X
Ht ∗mt X
Education*mt X
Veteran Status X X X
Living Parents X X X
Mother’s Age X X X
Father’s Age X X X
Physical Work X X X
Hazard Exposure X X X
Strength Required X X X
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Table V: CDE Parameter Estimates for Per-period Medical Care Expenditure
Variables X Xγ Xγ2
Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err
Constant -4.808 ***0.200 1.098 ***0.194 0.035 0.058
Health 1.944 ***0.134 -0.825 ***0.134 -0.543 ***0.035
Change In Health 1.038 ***0.146 1.012 ***0.164 0.330 ***0.046
Non-Housing Wealth 0.006 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.006 ***0.002
Income 0.201 ***0.04 0.079 *0.041 -0.026 **0.011
Insurance -0.302 ***0.055 -0.522 ***0.056 -0.153 ***0.015
Number of Children 0.043 ***0.010 0.041 ***0.010 0.011 ***0.003
Age 1.584 ***0.204 1.089 ***0.208 -0.119 **0.055
Marital Status -0.128 **0.058 -0.512 ***0.057 -0.211 ***0.015
Widowed -0.384 ***0.064 -0.469 ***0.064 -0.129 ***0.017
Northeast Region -0.155 ***0.036 -0.129 ***0.014
Western Region -0.078 **0.036 -0.096 ***0.013
Midwest Region -0.079 ***0.031 0.020 *0.012
Black -0.041 0.040 -0.107 ***0.143
Female 0.447 ***0.027 0.249 ***0.010
Years of Schooling 0.088 0.062 -0.724 ***0.063 -0.356 ***0.016
Lagged Medical Care 1.898 ***0.193 0.574 **0.263 -1.838 ***0.080
Lagged Consumption 0.100 ***0.015 0.091 ***0.015 0.015 ***0.004
µm1 0.873 ***0.010
µm2 -0.357 ***0.012
νmt 2.362 ***0.038
Note there are three estimates and standard errors for each variable.
All parameter estimates (and standard errors) capture how that variable affects the hazard probability.
The 2nd and 3rd sets of estimates have the variable interacted with γ and γ2.
γ is a negative valued term that decreases in magnitude in each successive quantile of the
distribution of the dependent variable. The estimates for Xγ and Xγ2 reflect the effect of given variable
on “survival probabilities” changes over the support of the dependent variable.
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Table VI: CDE Parameter Estimates for Per-period Consumption
Variables X Xγ Xγ2
Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err
Constant 0.213 0.207 -6.903 ***0.208 -2.867 ***0.053
Health 1.647 ***0.140 2.647 ***0.140 0.709 ***0.036
Change In Health -0.980 ***0.173 -1.745 ***0.184 -0.463 ***0.050
Non-Housing Wealth -0.152 ***0.003 0.305 ***0.004 0.131 ***0.001
Income -0.337 ***0.018 1.604 ***0.028 0.410 ***0.010
Insurance 0.567 ***0.056 0.589 ***0.055 0.119 ***0.014
Number of Children -0.016 *0.009 -0.080 ***0.009 -0.028 ***0.003
Age -2.638 ***0.183 1.457 ***0.198 1.067 ***0.054
Marital Status 0.885 ***0.065 1.100 ***0.064 0.238 ***0.016
Widowed 0.298 ***0.077 0.680 ***0.075 0.199 ***0.019
Northeast Region -0.092 ***0.027 -0.014 0.012
Western Region -0.086 ***0.025 -0.022 **0.011
Midwest Region 0.038 0.023 0.041 ***0.010
Black 0.511 ***0.036 0.178 ***0.016
Female -0.173 ***0.019 -0.089 ***0.008
Years of Schooling 0.051 ***0.061 1.973 ***0.065 0.627 ***0.017
Lagged Medical Care 0.482 **0.220 2.030 ***0.270 0.615 ***0.077
Lagged Consumption 0.269 ***0.007 0.178 ***0.009 0.056 ***0.003
µz1 -0.042 ***0.014
µz2 -0.050 ***0.010
νzt 0.051 ***0.014
Note there are three estimates and standard errors for each variable.
All parameter estimates (and standard errors) capture how that variable affects the hazard probability.
The 2nd and 3rd sets of estimates have the variable interacted with γ and γ2.
γ is a negative valued term that decreases in magnitude in each successive quantile of the
distribution of the dependent variable. The estimates for Xγ and Xγ2 reflect the effect of given variable
on “survival probabilities” changes over the support of the dependent variable.
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Table VII: CDE Parameter Estimates for Per-period Health Transition
Variables X Xγ Xγ2
Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err
Constant 7.361 ***0.663 1.668 **0.746 1.477 ***0.213
Lagged Health -11.445 ***0.172 -1.024 ***0.146 -0.165 ***0.036
Age 6.103 ***1.939 2.775 2.183 0.090 0.560
Age Squared 0.055 0.146 -0.058 0.162 0.337 0.443
Change in Health 4.187 ***0.595 0.042 0.515 -0.120 0.120
Lagged Medical 3.281 **6.996 -1.389 5.743 -0.947 1.181
Lagged Health*Lagged Medical -5.278 **2.431 3.926 6.779 -1.987 1.393
Years of Schooling 0.021 ***0.007 0.114 ***0.008 0.028 ***0.002
Years of School*Lagged Medical 0.350 -0.259 -0.021 0.237 -0.021 0.055
Lagged Consumption 1.086 0.055 -0.253 0.048 -0.098 0.056
Northeast Region 0.078 **0.035 0.059 ***0.015
Western Region -0.175 ***0.034 -0.033 0.015
Midwest Region 0.184 ***0.031 0.118 ***0.013
Black 0.686 ***0.072 0.268 ***0.075
Female 0.014 0.031 0.138 ***0.048
Lagged Health*Lagged Cons. -0.288 0.255 0.015 0.232 0.018 0.052
µH1 -1.216 ***0.011
µH2 1.096 ***0.011
νHt -0.014 0.015
Note there are three estimates and standard errors for each variable.
All parameter estimates (and standard errors) capture how that variable affects the hazard probability.
The 2nd and 3rd sets of estimates have the variable interacted with γ and γ2.
γ is a negative valued term that decreases in magnitude in each successive quantile of the
distribution of the dependent variable. The estimates for Xγ and Xγ2 reflect the effect of given variable
on “survival probabilities” changes over the support of the dependent variable.
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Table VIII: CDE Parameter Estimates for Initial Health Expression
Variables X Xγ Xγ2
Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err
Constant -2.982 ***2.331 2.183 2.489 1.618 **0.642
Age 0.516 0.767 0.096 0.081 0.129 0.201
Age Squared -0.088 0.615 0.134 0.641 -0.551 1.587
Number of Living Parents 0.134 0.145 0.213 0.154 0.055 0.039
Mothers Age 1.039 *0.542 0.952 *0.511 0.159 0.121
Fathers Age 0.929 **0.475 0.971 **0.454 0.207 *0.109
Years of Schooling 0.095 ***0.030 0.143 ***0.029 0.021 ***0.007
Veteran Status -0.369 *0.209 -0.369 *0.217 -0.091 *0.054
Insured -0.818 ***0.195 -1.169 ***0.202 -0.309 ***0.051
Married 0.301 0.233 0.163 0.231 -0.034 0.055
Number of Children 0.069 0.046 0.075 0.047 0.021 *0.011
Northeast Region 0.095 0.093 0.079 **0.039
Western Region 0.092 0.092 0.093 **0.039
Midwest Region 0.316 ***0.083 0.165 ***0.036
Black 0.091 **0.045 0.053 0.067
Female -0.072 **0.031 -0.029 0.031
Physical Requirements 0.272 ***0.075 0.182 ***0.034
Strength Requirements 0.157 0.099 0.017 0.043
Hazard Exposure -0.697 *0.409 -0.222 0.180
µH11 2.896 ***0.029
µH12 1.238 ***0.022
Note there are three estimates and standard errors for each variable.
All parameter estimates (and standard errors) capture how that variable affects the hazard probability.
The 2nd and 3rd sets of estimates have the variable interacted with γ and γ2.
γ is a negative valued term that decreases in magnitude in each successive quantile of the
distribution of the dependent variable. The estimates for Xγ and Xγ2 reflect the effect of given variable
on “survival probabilities” changes over the support of the dependent variable.
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Table IX: CDE Parameter Estimates for Initial Medical Care
Variables X Xγ Xγ2
Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err Estimate Std. Err
Constant 0.004 3.172 0.112 3.385 -1.480 *0.874
Age 0.174 1.166 -0.033 1.232 -0.377 0.314
Age Squared -0.096 1.074 0.099 1.120 0.406 2.846
Number of Living Parents 0.215 *0.109 -0.107 **0.044 0.038 0.030
Mothers Age 0.198 0.520 0.373 0.559 0.108 0.144
Fathers Age 0.121 0.481 0.217 0.521 0.067 0.135
Years of Schooling -0.098 ***0.022 -0.140 ***0.024 -0.042 ***0.006
Veteran Status 0.299 *0.165 0.352 **0.174 0.111 **0.044
Insured -0.099 0.167 -0.248 0.177 -0.103 **0.046
Married -0.194 0.162 -0.520 ***0.177 -0.176 ***0.046
Number of Children 0.027 0.034 0.053 0.037 0.015 *0.009
Northeast Region -0.047 0.105 -0.002 0.043
Western Region 0.144 0.093 0.084 **0.038
Midwest Region 0.121 0.085 0.066 0.048
Black 0.218 **0.085 0.042 0.120
Female -0.126 ***0.034 0.109 **0.050
Physical Requirements 0.167 **0.085 0.033 0.036
Strength Requirements 0.088 0.111 0.017 0.046
Hazard Exposure -0.436 0.455 -0.115 0.189
µm11 -0.362 0.037
µm12 -0.076 0.036
Note there are three estimates and standard errors for each variable.
All parameter estimates (and standard errors) capture how that variable affects the hazard probability.
The 2nd and 3rd sets of estimates have the variable interacted with γ and γ2.
γ is a negative valued term that decreases in magnitude in each successive quantile of the
distribution of the dependent variable. The estimates for Xγ and Xγ2 reflect the effect of given variable
on “survival probabilities” changes over the support of the dependent variable.
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Table X: Marginal Effects of Key Variables on Medical Care and Consumption
Variables Medical Care Consumption
Bottom Inter Top Bottom Inter Top
Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
Health -8.8% -22.3% -30.3% 5.5% 3.3% 0.3%
Reference Health 10.5% 14.1% 18.5% 3.8% 4.0% 1.4%
Non-Housing Wealth 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.5% 1.1% 0.7%
Income -0.1% -0.2% -0.4% 29.4% 6.5% 2.8%
Insurance -3.1% -2.6% 3.5% 18.2% 7.4% 1.4%
Number of Children -1.4% -1.8% -2.4% 10.4% 0.7% 0.05%
Age 4.1% 2.0% -5.8% -10.3% -14.6% -10.3%
Marital Status 20.0% 4.6% -0.7% 18.3% 17.1% 3.7%
Widowed 12.7% 15.5% 12.6% 3.0% 1.8% 0.9%
Black -31.8% -23.8% -9.8% -2.5% -21.6% -16.5%
Female 14.2% -10.1% -18.0% 1.7% 2.2% 2.7%
Years of Schooling -1.0% -6.8% -11.5% 4.8% 4.2% 1.5%
Lagged Medical Care 1.1% 1.3% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Lagged Consumption -2.5% -0.8% 1.1% 1.0% -1.0% -1.0%
Table XI: Marginal Effects of Key Variables on Health
Variables Health
Bottom Inter Top
Quartile Quartile Quartile
Health 4.4% 7.7% 9.1%
Reference Health 4.2% 1.4% 0.8%
Age -4.1% -2.3% -1.4%
Black -2.4% -1.8% -0.7%
Female 12.2% 6.5% 2.2%
Lagged Medical Care -0.4% -1.6% -1.4%
Lagged Consumption -0.3% -0.5% -0.7%
Lagged Health*mt−1 1.2% 2.4% 2.5%
Years of Schooling * mt−1 0.1% 0.0% -0.1%
Lagged Health * ct−1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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Figure 1: Kernel Density of Predicted and Observed Health Index, Medical Care, and Con-
sumption Expenditures Distribution
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Table XII: Matching Observed Means of the Top 5%
Variable Observed Data Preferred Model Grossman
Age 70.70 70.77 73.39
Health 0.636 0.456 0.26
Reference Health 0.078 0.073 -0.004
Years of Schooling 12.42 12.13 11.67
Female 0.635 0.646 0.611
Married 0.575 0.487 0.546
Income 0.497 0.460 0.432
Lagged Medical Care 0.037 0.033 0.055
Numbers in bold indicate they are statistically significantly closer to the values observed
in the data by 5%, as determined by two-tailed test for difference in mean.
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